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Ideas in literature are immersed into a huge mass of non-conceptual discourses; take very often 
a metaphoric form; they are in many texts entrusted to fictional persons, to imaginary charac-
ters; they have a specific, and even paradoxical, form of responsibility. These features of ideas in 
literature, making them a privileged object of study in intellectual history, are exemplified by 
Théophile Gautier’s novel Mademoiselle de Maupin, more precisely by its preface, considered to be 
a manifesto of Art for Art’s Sake doctrine. 
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Intellectual history approaches ideas nearly in the same way as literary studies approach 
literature. Abstracting away from their verity or falsehood and considering false ideas 
along with true ones, a historian of ideas operates like a literary historian with fictional 
characters and plots. To a certain extent, the history of ideas may be envisaged as a dis-
ciplinary exclave of literary history, projecting onto non-literary, non-fictional domains. 
Of course, the inverse projection is also possible and largely practiced; intellectual history 
often takes literature as its object or material of study. Indeed, it is proper for ideas to 
circulate and to transform so that they do not always possess a conceptual form. Litera-
ture is revealed to be a privileged area of such transformations, and in what follows I will 
survey a selection of these mutations. 
First, ideas in literature are immersed into a huge mass of non-conceptual discourses: 
narratives, evaluations, expressions of passions, jokes, and so on. Very frequently, they 
are present implicitly, in sentences which do not aim to express or clarify any ideas. This 
implicit and seemingly inessential character to literary ideas is confirmed, among others, 
by the traditions of censorship, which in literature pursues mostly revelations of secrets, 
transgressions of religious and moral prohibitions, subversive political tendencies, ob-
scene words and images, but almost never abstract notions and statements (as it does 
towards political, religious, and sometimes scientific discourses), even when such notions 
or statements are obvious in literary texts. In the best cases, – in fact, quite bad! – cen-
sorship imposes on literature an ‘ideology’, mostly constituted by vague convictions and 
‘myths’, rather than by clearly formulated ideas. To be sure, literature is not the only field 
of this ‘impure’, infra-conceptual discourse, as it shares this status with countless every-
day conversations. Only in literature (and partly in journalism), however, are such con-
versations noted down and conserved in documentary form. That is why literature pos-
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sesses an exceptional value for intellectual history, as a laboratory where we can observe 
on texts the real circulation and transformation of ideas in ordinary social communication. 
Second, and this point is more specific to literature and arts, literary ideas take very 
often a metaphoric form. To a certain extent, metaphoric function is even an obligatory 
condition for the ‘artistic’ status of a text. A work of art is supposed to tell us something 
more general than a singular ‘story’; it must express some ideas – be it Platonic immuta-
ble ideas, Hegelian self-unfolding ideas, or otherwise – in order to take place in the histo-
ry of art. “Only things that have been ideologically appropriated by culture are intro-
duced by it into history”, states Mikhail Iampolski (Iampolski 15). In this sense, all that is 
the history of literature and of arts is a history of ideas. This is particularly clear in litera-
ture, being the aesthetic activity with linguistic, semantically meaningful material. Each 
word of a literary text brings already, before its aesthetic use, an intelligible sense, an 
‘idea’, but this primary sense can interest only a ‘historian of concepts’, not a ‘historian of 
ideas’ as such, who analyzes not common linguistic elements belonging to nobody, but 
semantic units that correspond to certain people, are discussed among them, are pro-
posed by some against others, and so forth. Such twice-meaningful (linguistically and so-
cio-historically) ideas must be highlighted in a text and detached from its neutral verbal 
background, or ‘estranged’ (to borrow a term from Russian formalists). The best device 
for this effect is precisely a metaphorical transformation, giving an altered, ‘figurative’, 
and hard-to-read expression. The word liberty had been present in literary texts long be-
fore the Romantics, but only in the 19th century did it begin to designate an idea in litera-
ture – symbolized for example as a torn-away leaf or a solitary sail in Mikhail Lermon-
tov’s poems, The Leaf and The Sail respectively – while the same idea was allegorized as a 
young woman in French painting (Eugène Delacroix’ Liberty Leading the People) or sculp-
ture (Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi’s Liberty Enlightening the World). For a historian of ideas 
the problem is to track intellectual units – ideas or proto-ideas – under sensual, meta-
phorical, sometimes unrecognizable forms. Fortunately, literature can give the historian 
some help, as text points to figures and expressions suitable to bear such intellectual 
charges. 
Third, ideas in literature are in many texts entrusted to fictional persons, to imaginary 
characters. This entails not only a fictionalization of ideas, transformed into poetic inven-
tions of a kind, as this fictionalization results from the general attitude of intellectual his-
tory towards historical ideas. It also involves an intense discussion about the ideas in ques-
tion. In literary narratives, in dramatic texts, and often in poems too, an idea belongs to 
somebody; there is someone in the text to argue it and other persons to understand 
and/or to debate it. Mikhail Bakhtin, in his famous book on Dostoevsky’s poetics (Bakh-
tin, Problems, chapter 3), proposed a distinction between “monologic” and “dialogic” 
types of narration, which implies two different states of ideas. In the former type ideas 
declared by literary characters or suggested by the author remain equal to themselves, 
and the writer cares only to make them internally consistent. In the latter type they col-
lide with one another, disputing and dividing the verity. Associated with people who 
think and support them, with “characters-ideologists” (Bakhtin’s word), they become in-
dividuals themselves; they come to possess an image. In monologic narratives, Bakhtin 
explains, the only possible individualization of an idea is an error – ideas have images in-
asmuch as they are wrong, and their supporters blind and ridiculous; true ideas are with-
out image, like God. In dialogic narratives each idea (there may be several at once) pos-
sesses its part of truth, and their most interesting quality is their incompleteness, being 
always particular and relative, contrasting with the total truth or falsehood of ‘monologic’ 
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ideas. By their imperfections they can communicate. In fact, they do so nearly in the 
same way as humans, who, according to Georges Bataille, can communicate only by their 
physical or moral flaws and defects (Bataille 266).  
Intellectual history, of course, may treat such productive conflicts of ideas as dialec-
tics, although Bakhtin himself did not like this method of thinking and considered it as a 
restrictive and artificially ‘frozen’ form of dialogue, neglecting the interpersonal character 
of the latter. But even ‘monologic’ ideas, for example in a satirical parable intended to 
discredit them, undergo some important modifications as compared to non-literary ideas. 
So, in Voltaire’s Candide a general philosophical idea of the “best possible world”, sup-
posedly borrowed from Leibniz and once entrusted to fictional characters, turns out to 
be, first, logically distorted – instead of being applied to an imaginary range of possible 
worlds it is confronted by all the evils of the real one – and, second, related to the expe-
rience of several men and women, one of whom at the end of his quest decides not to 
seek for a better world but to improve the existing one by ‘cultivating his garden’. An 
implicit discussion underlies Voltaire’s plot, manifesting itself not only in the direct 
speeches of the characters but in their deeds and adventures as well. 
Fourth, – and here I come closest to the sociological view of things – ideas in litera-
ture have a specific, and even paradoxical, form of responsibility. Like any other cultural 
activity, literature constitutes a special field and its agents are evaluated and ranked ac-
cording to diverse internal and external criteria. The originality of literature, in the sense 
that interests us, consists in the fact that literature cannot do without ideas, it consumes 
ideas on a large scale, but its internal evaluations are based not upon ideological criteria. 
Only external evaluations can be so, taking the form of ideological censorship (see 
above) or of political engagement, while mostly ignoring literary ideas altogether. Writers 
and works of literature are generally appreciated for the form they impose on ideas. This 
Buffon has named the style, supposing that ideas can freely migrate from one author to 
another, maintaining their identity and even undergoing improvement under their new 
users. By contrast, the style characterizes the uniqueness of an author (“the style is the 
man himself”, Buffon said in 1753) (Buffon 503). As a result, ideas contained in a literary 
work, on the one hand, should be well displayed, recognizable, preferably profound and 
‘philosophical’, but on the other hand, nobody is really responsible for them – neither 
the characters who declare them and who are fictional, nor the author who generally is 
not supposed to share the ideas he or she relates in a novel. A literary idea, as I have said, 
always belongs to somebody, but its fictional character finally removes responsibility. 
Paradoxically, ownership and responsibility do not come together here; normally we are 
responsible for the things we own, but it is not so in literature. Unlike pedagogical texts, 
the works of literature do not even have to expound their ideas exactly: confusions and 
contradictions are welcome. As a further consequence, these ideas, stated by concrete 
persons but in fact engaging nobody’s responsibility, tend to be radicalized. Responsible 
ideas, constantly proofed and measured through discussions and social evaluations, are 
generally forced to moderation, as happens in sciences, philosophy, religion, and politics. 
In literature, where any discussion of ideas remains itself fictional, nothing prevents ideas 
from reaching extreme forms and from justifying the most intransigent judgments. The 
intratextual dialogue, mentioned above, can but intensify their radicalization. So it is that, 
in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, characters discuss unceasingly and in doing so un-
fold the riskiest, most dangerous possibilities of their initial insights. In nearly the same 
sense, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht defines not only literature itself but also its study as an ex-
ercise of “riskful thinking” (Gumbrecht 126). The radicalism of literature has been con-
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ceptualized metaphysically by Maurice Blanchot, who treated the “essential solitude” 
(Blanchot 7) in which a literary work is produced. Critics and philologists expound much 
upon intertextuality, upon circulating themes and semantic units (for instance, ideas) in 
verbal culture, but this circulation does not affect the uniqueness of the writer’s and 
reader’s experience. Creating or perceiving a work of literature can be but a singular act, 
incomparable to any other. Within such experience, the ideological content of the work 
has no essential relations to the content of others. It seems to grow by itself, without ex-
ternal limitations, and quite naturally comes to the most radical conclusions.  
To exemplify these abstract speculations, I have chosen a French novel first pub-
lished in 1835, namely Théophile Gautier’s Mademoiselle de Maupin. More precisely, I have 
selected for study its famous foreword, considered to be an outstanding manifesto of the 
idea named Art for Art’s sake. The intellectual and social origins of this idea are well 
known. Intellectually it derives from German aesthetics of the Romantic epoch, which 
proclaimed the independence of literature and arts as special forms of spiritual activity. 
Socially it corresponded to the autonomy of the literary field in the 19th century when, 
for the first time in history, literature became a profession sufficiently remunerative that 
men of letters needed no longer to solicit personal awards from aristocratic patrons and 
could earn their living by selling copyrights. The autonomous state of this social field 
implied that its internal peer-evaluations could prevail over the external (commercial) 
ones, and the idea of “pure literarity”, as Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out (Bourdieu 393 
ff.), expressed this new freedom of men of letters in and from the society. So, to the so-
ciological point of view, it is only natural that it was a writer as young and ambitious as 
Gautier – 24 at the moment his first novel was published – and eager to secure a posi-
tion within the field, who formulated the most vehement, the most aggressive version of 
l’Art pour l’Art. This doctrine is self-referential, serving to justify its own application by 
the very same man professing it. 
What is in question now is how literature shapes Gautier’s argument, how the form, 
and partly the content of this argument are overdetermined by literary discourse. We find 
here all the features of literary ideas listed above. 1) The intellectual claim, in Gautier’s 
text, is mixed with personal appreciations, polemical insults addressed to his opponents 
(critics supporting the ‘moral’ and ‘progressive’ destination of literature), some self-
promotion of the novelist himself, and so on; all this is typical for the 19th-century jour-
nalistic discourse to which Gautier’s critical text belongs, even though it was not pub-
lished in a journal or a newspaper. 2) The idea of the independence of art is systematical-
ly expressed by metaphors, among which the metaphor of home is particularly important 
and meaningful. Paradoxically, while discussing a problem of public life the writer feigns 
to leave the public space and to retire into the intimacy of private pleasures (“rereading 
Pantagruel between my bottle and my pipe”) (Gautier 178); the metaphorization is typical 
of literary discourse, but in Gautier’s text it is highlighted by the paradoxical nature of his 
metaphors, which highlight in turn the defiant nature of his idea. 3) Gautier emphasizes 
its personal involvement with the debate, by simulating in his printed text an oral speech 
and a particularly loud and familiar kind of speech proper to fair barkers, and by staging 
his speech as a public show – apostrophizing the audience, anticipating its reactions, and 
thus producing highly dialogic discourse, which should have interested Bakhtin (the 
mention of Rabelais’ book Pantagruel is also quite symptomatic; cf. Bakhtin’s book on 
Rabelais – Bakhtin, Rabelais). 4) Finally, Gautier radicalizes the meaning of the idea he is 
defending Instead of discarding the morality in arts, he affects the immorality of the 
dandy, and, criticizing the principle of utility as applied to poetry, he goes so far as to af-
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firm a general superiority of the beauty over the utility, even in the ordinary life. Moreo-
ver, and this is the most curious, he would like to discredit the expression of any ideas in 
literature, be it religious, moralistic, republican, Saint-Simonian, or otherwise. He em-
ploys the word idea with a sarcastic tone, putting it into ironic quotation marks as a claim 
that his ‘stupid’ opponents supposedly repeated it: “in every work an idea, an idea is re-
quired… an idea moral and religious…”, and so on (Gautier 180). Gautier seems una-
ware that by his depreciation of ideas in literature he undermines his own discourse, in-
tended after all to assert an idea of aesthetics! The self-referentiality of his doctrine thus 
becomes self-destruction. Of course, Gautier does not do so in a novelistic narration; ra-
ther, he does so in a foreword that serves as a text of criticism. Nevertheless, his dis-
course is obviously shaped as a brilliant literary one, ruled by artistic principles. Sympto-
matically this discourse radicalizes its idea (the independence of art) insomuch that ideas 
and literature are presented as enemies. 
But is it really so? This is the last question I would like to examine. From what I have 
said one can conclude that literature only deforms ideas, obscures them with formal (par-
ticularly logical) distortions, deafens them with irrelevant informational noise. In that 
case, the only thing that intellectual history has to do with literature would be cleaning 
ideas of their literary pollution: subjecting literary texts to ‘historical criticism’, in the 
same way that a historian filters his or her sources in order to extract from them some 
reliable factual information. According to this point of view, an intellectual historian is 
interested in literary texts but not for long; his or her task is to work them out and then 
to forget them. But this view is not exact, for literature has the privilege to display ideas 
in their becoming, their emergence from ‘impure’ cultural elements, and this process of 
idea-building cannot be indifferent to intellectual history. Literature puts ideas in relation 
to their authors and users, intentionally staging their interaction; such phenomena are 
close to those explored by the sociological branch of intellectual history. Literature does 
not present them statistically but individually, as personal acts and utterances of ‘charac-
ter-ideologists’. Finally, literature offers to an intellectual historian some privileged ex-
amples of radicalized ideas, proper to semantic and historical analysis but at the same 
time related to the structure of specific social fields. So, literature should not be consid-
ered as an indifferent or even alien material to intellectual history but rather as a condo-
minium of literary and historical studies. The cooperation of literary scholars and intel-
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